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Abstract. We investigate the accumulated wealth distribution by adopting evolutionary games taking
place on scale-free networks. The system self-organizes to a critical Pareto distribution (1897) of wealth
P (m) ∼ m−(v+1) with 1.6 < v < 2.0 (which is in agreement with that of U.S. or Japan). Particularly,
the agent’s personal wealth is proportional to its number of contacts (connectivity), and this leads to the
phenomenon that the rich gets richer and the poor gets relatively poorer, which is consistent with the
Matthew Effect present in society, economy, science and so on. Though our model is simple, it provides
a good representation of cooperation and profit accumulation behavior in economy, and it combines the
network theory with econophysics.
PACS. 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees – 05.10.-a Com-
putational methods in statistical physics and nonlinear dynamics – 89.75.-k Complex systems
1 Introduction
The interaction of many cooperatively interacting agents
in economy has many features in common with the statis-
tical physics of interacting systems. A century ago, Pareto
(1897) showed that the probability distribution P (W ) for
income or wealth of an individual in the market decreased
with the wealth W according to a power law [1]:
P (W ) ∝W−(1+v) (1)
where the value of v was found to lie between 1 and 2
[2,3,4,5]. Studies on real data show that the high-income
group indeed follows the Pareto law, with v varying from
1.6 for USA [2] to 1.8-2.2 in Japan [3].
The previous studies of wealth distribution often adopt
an ideal-gas model in which each agent is represented by a
gas molecule and each trading is a money-conserving col-
lision [6,7,8,9,10,11]. The model considers a closed eco-
nomic system where the total money is conserved and the
number of economic agents is fixed. Money and average
money per agent are equivalent to the energy and tem-
perature in an equilibrium system. Basically, this ideal-
gas model can only reproduce the Gibb distribution or
Gaussian-like stationary distribution of money [6]. How-
ever, Chatterjee et al introduce the quenched saving propen-
sity of the agents, and the system self-organizes to the
a
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Pareto distribution of money with v ∼ 1 [10]. We also note
that the model is not suitable for studying the material
wealth distribution because, in general, the total material
wealth of the system will increase with time [7,10].
The unique feature of our work is that we adopt the
scale-free network to represent the cooperative structure
in population and study the wealth increment by using
evolutionary games as a paradigm for economic activities.
A wide range of systems in nature and society can
be described as complex networks. Since the discovery of
small-world phenomena by Watts and Strogatz [12] and
Scale-free phenomena by Baraba´si and Albert [13],investigation
of complex networks has attracted continuous attention
from the physics community [14].
Network theory provides a natural framework to de-
scribe the population structure by representing the agents
of a given population with the network vertices, and the
contacts between those agents with edges [15]. One can
easily conclude that well-mixed populations can be rep-
resented by complete (fully-connected, regular) networks.
Spatially-structured populations are associated with reg-
ular networks, exhibiting a degree distribution d(k) which
is sharply peaked at a single value of the connectivity k,
since all agents generally have the same averaged connec-
tivity. Recently, much empirical evidence of real-world so-
cial networks has revealed that they are associated with a
scale-free, power-law degree distribution, d(k) ∼ k−γ with
2 ≤ γ ≤ 3 [14,15,16,17]. That is, interactions in real-world
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networks are heterogeneous that different individuals have
different numbers of average neighbors whom they inter-
act with. Thus, the classic regular or random networks
are not good representations of many real social networks
which likely possess the self-organized mechanism. Hence,
in this paper, we adopt the scale-free network model to
construct the cooperation structure in population.
The evolutionary game theory has been considered to
be an important approach for characterizing and under-
standing the cooperative behavior in systems consisting
of selfish individuals [18,19]. Since their introduction, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Snowdrift Game (SG)
have drawn much attention from scientific communities
[20,21,22,23,24]. In both games, two players simultane-
ously decide whether to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Each
player will get a payoff based on his and his opponent’s
strategy in each step and then the players will choose to
change their strategy or to keep their strategy unchanged
based on some take-over strategies. One can see that both
games’ dynamics are very similar to the cooperation and
payoff activities between agents in economy and so they
are intrinsically suitable for characterizing the payoff and
wealth accumulating behavior in populations.
In this paper, we investigate the wealth accumulation
of agents playing evolutionary games on the scale-free
network. The simulation results show the Pareto wealth
distributions along with some remarkable phenomena in-
cluding the total wealth variation with game parameters,
and the Matthew Effect in economy, science, fame, and so
on[25,26,27,28].
2 Model
In this paper, the simulation starts from establishing the
underlying cooperation network structure according to the
most general Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network model
[13]. In this model, starting from m0 fully connected ver-
tices, one vertex with m ≤ m0 edges is attached at each
time step in such a way that the probability Πi of being
connected to the existing vertex i is proportional to the
degree ki of the vertex, i.e. Πi =
ki
Σjkj
, where j runs over
all existing vertices. Initially, an equal percentage of coop-
erators or defectors was randomly distributed among the
agents (vertices) of the population. At each time step, the
agents play the PD or SG with their neighbours and get
payoff according to the games’ payoff matrix.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player can either ‘co-
operate’ (invest in a common good) or ‘defect’ (exploit the
others investment). Two players both receive R upon mu-
tual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A defector
exploiting a cooperator gets an amount T and the ex-
ploited cooperator receives S, such that T > R > P > S.
So, ‘defect’ is the best response to any action by the op-
ponent [24]. Thus in a single play of the game, each player
should defect. In the Snowdrift Game (SG), the order of P
and S is exchanged, such that T > R > S > P . Compar-
ing with PD, SG is more in favor of cooperation. Following
common practice [20,23], we firstly rescale the games such
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Fig. 1. Wealth distribution P (W ) for N = 104 agents playing
PD game with b = 1.5 for 105 steps. The frequency of coop-
erators is 0.2137, and the maximum personal wealth is about
10000.
that each depends on a single parameter. For the PD, we
choose the payoffs to have the values T = b > 1, R = 1,
and P = S = 0, where 1 < b ≤ 2 represents the advantage
of defectors over cooperators. That is, mutual cooperators
each gets 1, mutual defectors 0, and D gets b against C.
The parameter b is the only parameter. For the SG, we
make T = 1 + β, R = 1, S = 1 − β, and P = 0 with
0 < β < 1 as the only parameter.
Evolution is carried out by implementing the finite
population analogue of replicator dynamics [18,23]. In each
step, all pairs of directly connected individual x and y en-
gage in a single round of a given game. The total payoff of
agent i for the step is stored as Pi. And the accumulative
payoff (Wealth) of agent i since the beginning of simu-
lation is stored as Wi. Then the strategy of each agent
(Cooperate or Defect) is updated in parallel according to
the following rule: whenever a site x is updated, a neigh-
bor y is drawn at random among all kx neighbors, and the
chosen neighbor takes over site x with probability:
Pxy =
1
1 + e(Px−Py)/γ
, (2)
where γ characterizes noise introduced to permit irrational
choices [29,30,31], and we make γ = 0.1 as in [30,31].
3 Simulation Results
We carry out the simulation for a population of N = 104
agents occupying the vertices of a BA scale-free network.
The distributions of wealth, total wealth, and k-wealth
relation were obtained after a time period of T = 105
steps.
We first examine the wealth distribution P (W ) of the
system. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the P (W ) for PD (b = 1.5)
and SG (β = 0.5) respectively. One can see that both
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Fig. 2. Wealth distribution P (W ) for N = 104 agents playing
SG game with β = 0.5 for 105 steps. The frequency of coop-
erators is 0.9999, and the maximum personal wealth is about
107.
charts show power-law distribution of personal wealth which
is in agreement with Pareto’s law with v = 1.90 and
v = 1.84 respectively. We perform different simulations by
altering the values of b and β, and the results show simi-
lar wealth distributions with extremely robust power law.
For different simulations, the exponential factor v varies
between 1.6 and 2.0 that are in agreement with the em-
pirical values observed in economies including that of U.S
(1.60) [2] and Japan (1.80 ∼ 2.20) [3]. We focus on the
payoff and wealth accumulating behavior in population.
In this sense, the wealth distribution we study here essen-
tially corresponds to ‘real wealth’ or ‘material wealth’, and
not the ‘paper money’ that is generally conserved in the
economic system. We also note that the wealth distribu-
tion is independent of the system size N or the simulation
time T . Although the system’s maximum personal wealth
is different for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 because of the difference
in cooperators’ frequency, the power law persists for both
high and low cooperator’s frequency cases. All these fac-
tors indicate the robustness of our model to reproduce the
Pareto Law of economy.
Now we consider the system’s total wealth variation
with the parameter b or β. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the
variation of total wealth of a N = 104 agents system play-
ing PD and SG respectively. One can see from Fig. 3 that
the total wealth takes a high value (≈ 4 × 109) when b is
relatively small (≤ 1.10). Then there is a bistable region
(1.12 < b < 1.40) where the total wealth can be either high
(≈ 4×109) or low (≈ 5×105). When b is greater than 1.40,
the total wealth remains low (≈ 5 × 105). The high value
of the system’s total wealth can be as large as 104 times
of the low value. We note that the total wealth value is
related to the frequency of cooperators such that the sys-
tem’s total wealth is high when the frequency is high, and
a low total wealth shows up when the frequency is low.
For instance, the frequency of cooperators is 0.9999 and
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Fig. 3. Total Wealth variation for N = 104 agents playing
PD game. The arrows with b1 = 1.10 and b2 = 1.40 show
the boundaries of the bistable region. The insert shows the
fluctuation of the total wealth in the high branch of the bistable
region.
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Fig. 4. Total Wealth variation for N = 104 agents playing SG
game.
the maximum total wealth is 3996720318 when b = 1.0.
However, the frequency of cooperators is only 0.2137 and
the total wealth is only 5461747 when b = 1.5. This phe-
nomenon implies that when the advantage of defectors
over cooperators is too high, the system will take the
risk of sharply reducing its total wealth. Thus, a defector-
favored economic rule can prohibit the emergence of coop-
erators and, what is more, greatly reduce the total wealth
of the system.
However, because the SG payoff matrix T > R > S >
P is intrinsically cooperator-favored, the total wealth for
SG fluctuates as the β value changes as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the relation of personal wealth
W with its connectivity k. One can see in both cases (PD
and SG) that the personal wealth is proportional to its
connectivity. Since the number of agents it contacts re-
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Fig. 5. K-Wealth relation for N = 104 agents playing PD
game with b = 1.5.
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Fig. 6. K-Wealth relation for N = 104 agents playing SG game
with β = 0.5.
flects the information resources it has, this model also
provides a framework to explain the fact that agents with
more information resources can gain more profit in mod-
ern society’s economy.
This proportional relation between personal wealth and
its connectivity is also a possible mechanism for the emer-
gence of the Matthew Effect in economy. The “Matthew
Effect” refers to the idea that in some areas of life (wealth,
achievement, fame, success et al), the rich gets richer and
the poor gets poorer [25,26,27,28]. The eminent sociol-
ogist Robert Merton used the term “Matthew effect” to
describe the deplorable practice of scientists giving exclu-
sive credit to the most distinguished one among several
equally deserving candidates [25]. The Matthew effect for
Countries (MEC) was also discovered [26]. Our simula-
tions capture a possible underlying mechanism for these
phenomena. In Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, the wealth variations
of two individual agents are compared. One can see that
with both PD and SG, the wealth of the agent with more
connectivity exceeds the agent with less connectivity. We
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Fig. 7. Matthew Effect in PD game. The one with more con-
nectivity surpass the one with fewer connectivity in their per-
sonal wealth.
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Fig. 8. Matthew Effect in SG game.
note that this tendency remains the same when different
values of parameter b or β are used. And also the tendency
is independent of the system size N or the simulation time
T . Thus, the agents with more cooperation partners will
get richer and richer while those with fewer partners will
get relatively poorer. It is true, from our experience, that
a successful people (company, country etc) usually have
more partners than a unsuccessful one, and this huge re-
lation network will provide him more profits. So, to some
extent, our model explains the Matthew Effect from a sta-
tistical point of view.
4 Conclusions
In conclusion, we have studied the wealth distribution in
economy by calculating the accumulative payoff of agents
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involving in revolutionary games on the cooperation net-
work with scale-free property. The simulations confirm
Pareto’s power law of wealth distribution. And the values
of exponential factor v are in agreement with the empirical
observations.
The simulation shows that the system’s total wealth
varies with the game parameters. The results of the PD
game shows that agents tend to cooperate with a fre-
quency of nearly 1.0 and a high total wealth can be achieved
when the advantage of defector over cooperator (b) is rel-
atively low. But the total wealth will drop to a very low
value when b is high. The total wealth of SG fluctuates as
the β value changes.
The model also provides a possible explanation for the
Matthew Effect from a statistical physics point of view.
The simulations show that the agents’ personal wealth is
proportional to the number of its contacts (connectivity).
This leads to the phenomenon that the rich gets richer
and the poor gets poorer (Matthew Effect). Thus, in this
sense, one has to increase the number of partners in order
to gain more profit in modern society. This also suggests
a framework to explain why agents with more informa-
tion resources can gain more profit in modern society’s
economy, since the connectivity is a representation of an
agent’s information resource.
It is evident from the above discussions that, our model
provides a simple but good approach to study the wealth
phenomena in economy, and therefore is worthy of more
attention.
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